Abstract-We consider team optimal control of decentralized systems with linear dynamics and quadratic costs that consist of multiple sub-populations with exchangeable agents (i.e., exchanging two agents within the same sub-population does not affect the dynamics or the cost). Such a system is equivalent to one where the dynamics and costs are coupled across agents through the mean-field (or empirical mean) of the states and actions. Two information structures are investigated. In the first, all agents observe their local state and the mean-field of all sub-populations; in the second, all agents observe their local state but the meanfield of only a subset of the sub-populations. Both information structures are non-classical and not partially nested. Nonetheless, it is shown that linear control strategies are optimal for the first and approximately optimal for the second; the approximation error is inversely proportional to the size of the sub-populations whose mean-fields are not observed. The corresponding gains are determined by the solution of K + 1 Riccati equations, where K is the number of sub-populations. The dimensions of the Riccati equations do not depend on the size of the sub-populations; thus the solution complexity is independent of the number of agents. Generalizations to major-minor agents, tracking cost, weighted mean-field, and infinite horizon are provided. The results are illustrated using an example of demand response in smart grids.
I. INTRODUCTION A. Motivation
Team optimal control of decentralized systems has been an important research topic since the mid 1960s. Many of the initial research results were negative and showed that even simple dynamical systems with two agents can be difficult to design [2] , [3] . Since then, various solution methodologies for the optimal control of decentralized systems have been proposed and there has been considerable progress in understanding the nature of system dynamics and the information structure under which these methodologies work. See [4] and references therein for an overview.
In spite of this progress, there is a big gap between the theory and applications of optimal decentralized control. On the one hand, the envisioned applications-which include networked control systems, swarm robotics, and modern power systems-often consist of multiple interconnected dynamical systems and controllers. On the other hand, explicit optimal solutions are available for systems with only a few (often two or three) controllers [5] - [7] . The model and results presented in this paper attempt to reduce the gap between theory and applications.
In particular, we study decentralized control systems in which the dynamics and cost satisfy a property that we call exchangeability. This property is inspired by the concept of exchangeability in probability theory. A collection of random variables (x 1 , . . . , x n ) are called exchangeable if, for any permutation σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) of (1, . . . , n), the probability distribution of (x σ1 , . . . , x σn ) is the same as that of (x 1 , . . . , x n ). Or, equivalently, the probability distribution does not depend on the index assigned to random variables.
In a dynamical system, we say agents i and j are exchangeable if exchanging (or interchanging) agents i and j does not affect the dynamics or the cost (the formal definition is given below). Or, equivalently, the dynamics and the cost do not depend on the index assigned to the two agents.
In many applications of decentralized systems, the system may be partitioned into sub-populations where all agents within a sub-population are exchangeable. For instance, in demand response in power systems, the system dynamics and cost would not change if the houses in a residential neighborhood were numbered differently; in swam robotics, the dynamics and cost depend on the position of the robots, not on how we index them. We call such systems as systems with partially exchangeable agents. In this paper, we develop a framework for the design of optimal decentralized control for such systems.
B. System with partially exchangeable agents
To formally define exchangeability, consider a multi-agent dynamical system where N denotes the set of agents. The state and action of agent i, i ∈ N , at time t are denoted by x i t and u i t , where x i t ∈ X i and u i t ∈ U i . Let x t = (x i t ) i∈N and u t = (u i t ) i∈N denote the state and action of the entire system. The dynamics are given by
where f t is system dynamics and {w t } t≥1 , where w t = (w i t ) i∈N and w i t ∈ W i , is the disturbance noise process. A per-step cost c t (x t , u t ) is incurred at each time t.
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For now, we do not specify the information structure as we want to identify the system properties that do not depend on the information structure.
For any state x and agents i, j ∈ N , let σ i,j x denote the state when agents i and j are exchanged. For example, if x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 ), then σ 2,4 x = (x 1 , x 4 , x 3 , x 2 , x 5 ). Similar interpretation holds for σ i,j u and σ i,j w.
Definition 1 (Exchangeable agents)
A pair (i, j) of agents is exchangeable if the following conditions hold:
1) X i = X j , U i = U j , and W i = W j , i.e., the states, actions, and disturbances of agents i and j have the same dimensions.
2) For any t, and any x t , u t , and w t , f t (σ i,j x t , σ i,j u t , σ i,j w t ) = σ i,j f t (x t , u t , w t ) , i.e., exchanging agents i and j does not affect the system dynamics.
3) For any t, and any x t and u t , c t (σ i,j x t , σ i,j u t ) = c t (x t , u t ),
i.e., exchanging agents i and j does not affect the cost.
Definition 2 (Exchangeable set of agents)
A set S of agents, S ⊆ N , is exchangeable if every pair of agents in S is exchangeable.
Definition 3 (System with partially exchangeable agents)
The multi-agent described above is called a system with partially exchangeable agents if the set N of agents can be partitioned into K disjoint subsets N k , k ∈ K := {1, . . . , K}, such that for each k ∈ K, the set N k of agents is exchangeable.
In this paper, we investigate optimal decentralized control of linear quadratic system (i.e., a system where dynamics are linear and the per-step cost is quadratic) with partially exchangeable agents. In a subsequent paper, we will investigate systems with controlled Markovian dynamics.
C. Notation
For a set N , |N | denotes its size. For a matrix A, A denotes its transpose, Tr(A) denotes its trace; if A is square, A ≥ 0 (respectively A > 0) denotes that A is positive semidefinite (respectively positive definite). For matrices A and B of appropriate size, A ≤ B means B − A ≥ 0, diag(A, B) denotes a block diagonal matrix with diagonal terms A and B, √ A denotes B where A = B B, A • B denotes Hadamard product, and A ⊗ B denotes Kronecker product. For matrices A, B, and C with the same number of columns, rows(A, B, C) denotes the matrix [A , B , C ] . For vectors x, y, and z, vec(x, y, z) denotes the vector [x , y , z ] .
Superscripts index agents (indexed by i) or sub-populations (indexed by k). Given a set N of agents and states x i , i ∈ N , bold x denotes vec(x 1 , . . . , x |N | ); when all states are of the same dimension, (x i ) i∈N denotes the mean-field
For vectors and matrices, we use the short hand notation x 1:t or A 1:t to denote (x 1 , . . . , x t ) and (A 1 , . . . , A t ), respectively. R, R ≥0 , and R >0 denote the sets of real, non-negative real, and positive real numbers, respectively. 1 n×m denotes n × m matrix of ones, I n denotes n × n identity matrix. We omit the subscripts when the dimensions are clear from the context. For a random variable x, E[x] and var(x) denote its mean and variance, respectively. Given horizon T and matrices A 1:T and Q 1:T , the notation M 1:T = DLE T (A 1:T , Q 1:T ) means that M 1:T is the solution of the finite horizon discrete Lyapunov equation, i.e., M T = Q T , and for t ∈ {T − 1, . . . , 1},
Similarly, given a horizon T and matrices A 1:T , B 1:T , Q 1:T , and R 1:T , the notation M 1:T = DRE T (A 1:T , B 1:T , Q 1:T , R 1:T ) means that M 1:T is the solution of the finite horizon discrete Riccati equation, i.e., M T = Q T , and for t ∈ {T − 1, . . . , 1},
Given a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1] and matrices A, B, Q, and R, the notation M = DALE β (A, Q) means that M is the solution of the discrete algebraic Lyapunov equation
and the notation M = DARE β (A, B, Q, R) means that M is the solution of the discrete algebraic Riccati equation
D. Linear quadratic system with partially exchangeable agents 1) System Model: Suppose the dynamics (1) are linear, i.e.,
where A t and B t are matrices of appropriate dimensions and {x 1 , {w t } T t=1 } are random variables defined on a common probability space. The cost is quadratic, i.e., for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1},
and
where Q t and R t are matrices of appropriate dimensions. Furthermore, assume that the above system is partially exchangeable, i.e., agents N can be partitioned into K disjoint sub-populations N k , k ∈ K := {1, . . . , K}, such that for each k ∈ K, the agents N k are exchangeable. Moreover, for any sub-population k ∈ K and agent i ∈ N k , state x t of sub-population k, k ∈ K, is defined as the empirical mean of the states of all agents in that sub-population, i.e.,
Similarly, the mean-field of the actionsū k t of sub-population k, k ∈ K, is defined as the empirical mean of the actions of all agents in that sub-population, i.e.,
The mean-field of states and actions of the entire population are denoted byx t andū t respectively, i.e.,
For ease of reference, the notation is summarized in Table I . Notation used for agent i ∈ N k belonging to sub-population k ∈ K
Action of agent i
Notation used for sup-population k ∈ K = {1, . . . , K}
Mean-field of actions at time t Notation used for entire population
Joint state of entire population at time t ut = (u i t ) i∈N Joint action of entire population at time t xt = vec(x 1
the per-step cost at time t ∈ {1, . . . , T −1}, may be written as
and the per-step cost at time t = T , may be written as
The proof is presented in Appendix A. Thus, any linear quadratic system with partial exchangeable agents-irrespective of the information structure-is equivalent to a mean-field coupled system with the same information structure. In the rest of this paper, we investigate the optimal control of such systems under the following two information structures.
2) Observation model and information structure: We consider two information structures; in both, agents perfectly recall all data that they observe. In the first information structure, which we call mean field sharing and denote by MFS-IS, every agent i ∈ N perfectly observes its local state x i t and the global mean-fieldx t . Thus, the data I i t available to agent i at time t is given by
(MFS-IS)
In the second information structure, which we call partial mean field sharing and denote by PMFS-IS, there exists a subset S of the sub-populations K such that every agent i ∈ N perfectly observes its local state x i t and the mean-fields of subpopulations S, i.e., {x k t } k∈S . We use S c to denote K\S. The data I i t available to agent i at time t is given by
Under both information structures, agent i chooses u i t as follows:
The function g i t is called the control law of agent i at time t.
is called the control strategy of agent i. The collection g = (g i ) i∈N is called the control strategy of the system. The performance of strategy g is given by
where the expectation is with respect to the measure induced on all the system variables by the choice of strategy g.
Remark 1
Note that the mean-field can be shared in a distributed manner using consensus algorithms [8] .
Problem 1 is a decentralized linear quadratic system with a non-classical information structure. In centralized linear quadratic systems, the optimal control strategy is linear in the agent's estimate of the state. The optimal gain is determined by the solution of backward Riccati equations and the agent's estimate is updated using Kalman filtering equations. However, this is not the case for decentralized systems. As illustrated by the Witsenhausen counterexample [2] , in decentralized systems non-linear strategies can outperform the best linear strategy. In general, linear strategies are globally optimal for only partially nested information structure [9] and its variations [10] . Even if attention is restricted to linear strategies, the problem of finding the best linear strategies may not be convex; it is convex only for special sparsity patterns such as funnel causality [11] and quadratic invariance [12] .
The mean-field sharing information structure (MFS-IS) is neither partially nested nor quadratic invariant. Hence, we cannot assert a priori that linear strategies are globally optimal or that the problem of finding the best linear strategies is convex. One of our contributions is to show that the linear strategies are optimal for MFS-IS.
The corresponding optimal gains are computed by K + 1 decoupled Riccati equations: one for each sub-population and one for the mean-field term. In fact, for the decentralized implementation, each agent simply needs to solve two Riccati equations: one corresponding to its own sub-population and one to the mean-field. The dimensions of these Riccati equations do not depend on the number of agents in each subpopulation. Thus, the solution complexity does not depend on the number of agents in the system. In addition, if the matrices defined in Proposition 1 do not depend on the number of agents in each sub-population, then neither do the optimal gains. Consequently, the agents need not even be aware of the size of each sub-population.
Furthermore, for partial mean field sharing information structure (PMFS-IS), we propose a linear strategy that is approximately optimal where the approximation error O(1/n), n := min k∈S c |N k |. The proposed strategy is a certainty equivalence strategy in which all agents generate an estimate of the unobserved components of the mean-field using the observed components of the mean field. This estimate is used in the optimal strategy identified for MFS-IS. We show that the approximation error between the proposed strategy for PMFS-IS and the optimal strategy for MFS-IS is given by terms of the weighted cost of a linear system, which can be computed by a Lyapunov equation.
In section III, we show that our results generalize to several variations of the basic mean-field model including: systems where a major agent interacts with a collection of minor agents; systems where there is no local control action; systems where agents have individual tracking cost; systems where agents have individual weights. In section VI, we show our results generalize to infinite horizon setup using standard arguments. In section VII, we illustrate the results using an example of demand response in smart grids.
Our model and results for MFS-IS are similar in spirit to those obtained in [13] under stronger modeling assumptions. In [13] , the authors consider a homogeneous population of dynamically decoupled agents which are coupled in the cost through a weighted mean-field term. Two models are investigated: (a) hard-constraint model where the weighted meanfield of actions must equal a pre-specified linear function of the weighted mean field of states; and (b) soft-constraint model where the above hard constraint is relaxed by penalizing it in the cost. For both models, the authors show that the optimal centralized control laws are linear in the local state and the mean field; the corresponding gains are computed by two decoupled Riccati equations. In section III-D, we generalize our results to the case when a weighted empirical mean field is shared. In contrast to [13] , we consider heterogeneous population and allow agents to be coupled in dynamics. Note that approximation results similar to those for partial meanfield sharing were not considered in [13] .
Our results have similar features to those obtained for centralized linear quadratic mean-field control [14] , [15] . In these models, the dynamics and the cost depend on the statistical mean-field of the state and action. Such a model may be viewed as a special case of our model when we restrict to a single homogeneous sub-population and consider the limit of infinite number of agents (and therefore the empirical mean and the statistical mean are the same). Our proof technique, which relies on a simple change of variables, is conceptually simpler than that of [14] , [15] . 2 It is worth highlighting that the linear quadratic mean-field control model is a centralized control problem and the results of [14] , [15] do not apply to the multi-agent models that we consider.
Recently, an iterative bidding strategy was proposed in [17] for the optimal control multi-agent systems with decoupled dynamics that are coupled through a constraint. For LQG agents, the scheme operates as follows: at each time, a coordinator sets a price profile for all future times; agents submit a bid profile for all future times; the coordinator updates the prices and the process continues until the bids have converged. Agents choose the first value of their bid as their action and the above process is repeated at the next time step. In this scheme, agents do not need to know the system dynamics of other agents. In contrast, we assume that the system dynamics are common knowledge to all agents. However, in our model, agents only need to share the mean-field of their states (which can be computed using a consensus algorithm) rather than iteratively sharing the bid profile for all future times.
An alternative decomposition-coordination approach for optimal decentralized control of deterministic LQ systems was proposed in [18] , [19] . This is an iterative approach. Each iteration consists of two steps: (i) a decomposition step in which each agent assumes decoupled dynamics and costs and computes its local control trajectory by solving an optimal tracking problem from pre-specified linear offsets for the dynamics and a reference trajectory for the cost; (ii) a coordination step in which the linear offsets for the dynamics and reference trajectories for the cost are computed for all agents from the pre-specified control trajectories. It is shown that this iterative process converges to the optimal centralized solution.
In contrast to such decomposition-coordination methods, our proposed solution is not iterative. The optimal gains for all agents are computed in a single step by solving Riccati equations. Furthermore, our solution methodology works for deterministic as well as stochastic systems.
A related solution approach called mean-field games (MFG) was proposed in [20] - [28] to compute approximate Nash equilibrium for large population games. The main idea is to assume an infinite large size of each sub-population and solve a set of two coupled equations: a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation to compute the best response of a generic agent playing against a "mass trajectory" and a Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equation to compute the mass trajectory from the strategy of a generic agent. It is shown that a solution to these equations exists under appropriate conditions. The resulting strategies are ε-Nash when the sub-populations are finite, where the approximation error is O(1/ √ n), n := min k∈K |N k |. For linear quadratic systems, the coupled HJB-FPK equations simplify to K Riccati equations and two coupled forward and backward ODEs. In contrast, in our solution there is an additional Riccati equation instead of the coupled forward-backward equations. The coupled equations in MFG depend on the initial mean-field while the Riccati equation in our solution does not. It is shown in [29] that when agents have decoupled dynamics, the MFG solution is ε-team-optimal with ε ∈ O(1/ √ n). We obtain a similar result for dynamically coupled agents with ε ∈ O(1/n).
Finally, in our opinion, the approach proposed in this paper is easier to generalize than the approach of MFG. As a case in point, considerable technical sophistication is needed in the MFG theory to solve the so called major-minor setup [30] (because the coupled forward-backward ODEs become SDEs). In contrast, as we show in section III-A, the majorminor setup is simply a special case of our model. For this reason, we believe that the results presented in this paper and the associated proof techniques may also be useful for MFG.
In many of the references cited above, the agent dynamics are assumed to be decoupled. In our model, the agent dynamics are coupled, which is significantly more challenging. 3 This is because, when the agent dynamics are decoupled, the information structure is partially nested, so one may restrict attention to linear strategies. Furthermore, for a finite horizon system team-optimal strategies may be obtained by solving a set of linear equations. 4 In contrast, when the system dynamics are coupled, the information structure is non-classical and there is no general solution methodology to obtain a teamoptimal solution.
II. MAIN RESULTS

A. Exact solution for MFS-IS
We impose following standard assumptions on the model:
The primitive random variables {x 1 , {w t } Then, the optimal cost is given by
The proof is presented in section IV. Note that the dimensions of Riccati equations (13) and (14) do not depend on the size of the sub-populations (|N 1 |, . . . , |N K |). Hence, the solution complexity depends only on the number K of subpopulations and it is independent of the number of agents in each sub-population. To implement the optimal control strategies:
• all agents must computeL 1:T −1 by solving the Riccati equation (14), • agents of sub-population k must computeL k 1:T −1 by solving the Riccati equation (13) . Then, an individual agent i of sub-population k, upon observing the local state x i t and the global mean-fieldx t , chooses its local control action according to (12) . Note that each agent needs to solve only two Riccati equations, although there are K + 1 Riccati equations in Theorem 1.
Remark 2 An interesting feature of the solution is that all agents in a particular sub-population use identical control laws. This is a feature of the linear quadratic system and not of exchangeability. See [32] for an example of an exchangeable system where the optimal control laws are not identical for all agents in a sub-population.
Remark 3 If the per-step cost has cross-terms involving (x i t ,x t ) and (u i t ,ū t ), i.e.,
then, this cost can be re-written in the form of (6) and (7):
, where
Remark 4 We assumed that there are no cross-terms of the form x Su in the per-step cost of (3) and (4). If such crossterms are present, there will be cross-terms involving (
, and (x t ,ū t ) in the equivalent mean-field model presented in Proposition 1. These cross-terms can be treated in the standard manner as cross-terms are treated in centralized LQR.
Remark 5 Suppose in addition to (A1), we have that {x 
The expression of total cost (15) can be simplified accordingly.
B. Approximate solution for PMFS-IS
In this section, we consider Problem 1 under PMFS-IS. Based on the results of Theorem 1, we propose a certainty equivalence strategy for PMFS-IS and show that the performance of this strategy is close to the optimal performance under MFS-IS. We impose the following assumptions on the model. Assumption (A1a) In addition to (A1), for any k ∈ S and k ∈ S c , initial states (x i 1 ) i∈N k are independent of (x j 1 ) j∈N k . Assumption (A1b) The primitive random variables {x 
The above strategy is similar to the optimal strategy for MFS-IS (given by (12) 
LetĴ denote the performance of strategy (18) and J * denote the optimal performance under MFS-IS. Then, the difference in performanceĴ − J * is bounded. In particular, we have Theorem 2 Assume (A1a), (A2), and (PMFS-IS). Then, 1) The performance loss is given bŷ
T is the solution of following Lyapunov equation:
. Under (A1b) and (A3),
The result is proved in Section V.
Remark 6
As the number of agents in each sub-population k ∈ S c , becomes large, the approximation errorĴ − J * goes to zero; therefore, PMFS-IS is as informative as MFS-IS.
Note that when the mean-field of all sub-populations are shared, then S = K and, therefore, H is zero. Consequently, the approximation error given by (19) is zero. Hence, the result of Theorem 2 is consistent with Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 When the mean-field is not shared, i.e., S = ∅, the approximation errorĴ − J * is Proof: When S = ∅, H is 1 dx×dx ; thus,Ã t is block diagonal. Consequently, the Lyapunov equation (20) decouples into the two smaller Lyapunov equations given above.
III. SPECIAL CASES AND GENERALIZATIONS
In this section, we show that our results generalize to variations of Problem 1. Due to space limitations, we only present the results for MFS-IS (i.e., the analogue of Theorem 1); the results for PMFS (i.e., the analogue of Theorem 2) may be derived in a similar manner.
A. Major Agent and a Population of Minor Agents
Suppose there exists one sub-population, say 1, with only 1 agent, i.e.,
The rest of the dynamics and cost are the same as in Section I-D. Since the dynamics are coupled through the mean-field, the state of the agent of sub-population 1 directly influences the dynamics of all other agents and the per-step cost. For this reason, such an agent is called a major agent. A variation of the above model was first introduced in [30] and other variations have been investigated in [33] - [35] .
For above model, result of Theorem 1 simplifies as follows.
Corollary 2 For any sub-population k ∈ K\{1} and minor agent i ∈ N k , u i t is given by (12) . For the major agent, the control law is given by u
Note thatL implies that the dynamics and cost are given as follows. Let
Then, for agent i ∈ N k of sub-population k ∈ K, we have
At time t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, the per-step cost is given by,
and t = T ,
Corollary 3 For the model described above, the optimal control law is given as follows. For all k ∈ K and i ∈ N k ,
where [L The proof is presented in Section IV-C.
Remark 7
Note that for the model defined above, each agent only needs to observe the mean-field of its sub-population (rather than the mean-field of entire population). Thus, this result is similar in spirit to [36, Theorem 1] .
C. Tracking cost function
Consider a tracking problem in which we are given a tracking signal {s
for the mean-field of subpopulation k ∈ K and a tracking signal {r 
and for t = T ,
We assume that, in addition to MFS-IS specified in Section I-D2, agent i also knows signals {r
. The rest of the model is the same as in Section I-D.
Theorem 3 Under (A1), (A2), and (MFS-IS), the optimal strategy is unique and given by
where the gains {L 
and rows(F 1 t , . . . ,F K t ) :=F t , wherē
The correction signals {v
are given recursively as follows: for t = T ,
and for t ∈ {T − 1, . . . , 1},
The proof is presented in Section IV-D. To implement the optimal control strategies:
• all agents must computeL 1:T −1 andF 1:T −1 by solving Riccati equation (14) and compute the global correction signalv 1:T by solving backward equations (22) and (24), • agents of sub-population k must computeL T by solving backward equations (22) and (23) . Then, an individual agent i of sub-population k, upon observing the local state x i t and the global mean-fieldx t , chooses its local control action according to (21) .
D. Systems coupled through weighted mean-field
Suppose there are weights (a i , λ i , b i ) associated with each agent i ∈ N such that a i , λ i ∈ R and b i ∈ R >0 . For each subpopulation k ∈ K define the weighted mean-field of states and actions as follows.
For sub-population k ∈ K, the state of agent i ∈ N k evolves as follows.
The per-step cost is given by
and the terminal cost is given by
Such models arise in applications where the interaction between two homogeneous agents is not symmetric but depends on their weights. For example, in wireless networks, the interference caused at the base-station depends on the distance of the agents from the base-station. We assume that the weights are related as follows.
Assumption (A4) For each sub-population k ∈ K and each
Given a sub-population k ∈ K, examples of weights that satisfy (A4) are: 
Proof of Theorem 4 is presented in Section IV-E.
Remark 8
The optimal strategy depends on the weights and, even within a sub-population, the gains of the mean-field terms are different for different agents.
Remark 9
If the dynamics of the agents are decoupled, i.e., a i = 0 for all agens, then the results of Theorem 4 are similar to the model with soft constraints discussed in [13] .
Note that if a i = b i = λ i = 1 for all agents, then the weighted mean-field model reduces to the basic model described in Proposition 1 and the result of Theorem 4 reduces to that of Theorem 1.
IV. PROOF OF THE RESULTS FOR MFS-IS
The main idea of the proof is as follows. We construct an auxiliary system whose state, control actions, and perstep cost are equivalent to x t , u t , and c t (·), respectively (modulo a change of variables that we describe later). However, this auxiliary system is centrally controlled by a single agent that has access to all the information available to the N decentralized agents in the original system. We show that the optimal centralized solution of this auxiliary system can be implemented in the original decentralized system, and is therefore also optimal for the decentralized system.
A. The auxiliary system
The auxiliary system is a centralized system with statex t = vec((x i t ) i∈N ,x t ) and actionů t = vec((ȗ i t ) i∈N ,ū t ). Note thatx t is equivalent to x t andů t is equivalent to u t .
The dynamics and cost of the auxiliary model are same as the model of Proposition 1. This implies that we can write,
wherew t := vec(w 1 t , . . . ,w K t ) andĀ t andB t are defined as in Theorem 1. In the auxiliary system, there is a single centralized agent that choosesů t based on the observations. In particular, the centralized agent observesx t and chooses u t according toů t =g t (x 1:t ,ů 1:t−1 ).
The performance of strategyg := (g 1 , . . . ,g T ) is given bẙ
where the expectation is with respect to the measure induced on all system variables by the choice of strategyg. We are interested in the following optimization problem.
Problem 2 In the auxiliary model, find strategyg * that minimizes (28), i.e.,J * :=J(g * ) = inf
where the infimum is taken over all strategies of the form (27) .
Let J * andJ * denote the optimal cost for Problem 1 and Problem 2, respectively. Since the per-step cost is the same in both cases, but Problem 2 is centralized, we have that J * ≥J * . We identify the optimal control laws for the auxiliary system and show that these laws can be implemented in, and therefore are optimal for, the original decentralized system. A critical step in the proof is to rewrite the per-step cost c t (x t , u t ,x t ,ū t ) and terminal cost c T (x T ,x T ) in terms ofx t andů t . For that matter, we need the following key result that is similar to Huygens-Steiner Theorem in mechanics [37] :
Proof: The result follows from elementary algebra and the observation that
An immediate consequence of Lemma 1 is the following:
Corollary 4 For time t, t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, there exists function c t , such that for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, c t (x t , u t ,x t ,ū t ) = c t (x t ,ů t ) and for t = T , c T (x T ,x T ) =c T (x T ). In particular, for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1},
and for t = T,
The auxiliary system is a centralized LQR system. So, the optimal control laws are linear and the optimal gains are given by the solution of an appropriate Riccati equation. However, the dimension of the statex t , and therefore the dimension of the Riccati equation, increases with the number of agents. We present an alternative approach that involves solving K + 1 Riccati equations that do not depend on the number of agents.
B. The Optimal Solution of the Auxiliary System
The auxiliary system is a stochastic linear quadratic system. From the certainty equivalence principle [38] , we know that the optimal control law is unique and identical to the control law in the corresponding deterministic system, whose dynamics are given as follows: for k ∈ K and i ∈ N
and whose per-step cost isc t (x t ,ů t ) given by Corollary 4. Note that this system consists of (N + 1) components: N components with statex i t and actionȗ i t , i ∈ N , and one component with statex t and actionū t . The first N components are split into K classes of identical componentsone for each sub-population. The components have decoupled dynamics and decoupled cost. Thus, the optimal control law of each class may be identified separately. In particular, Theorem 5 The optimal control strategy of the auxiliary model is unique and given bȳ
where the gains {L
t=1 are given as in Theorem 1. To complete the proof of Theorem 1, note that
Thus, the control laws specified in Theorem 1 are the optimal centralized control laws, and, a fortiori, the optimal decentralized control laws.
C. Proof of Corollary 3
Under the assumptions on the model, the dynamics, given by (25) and (26), simplify tȏ
Thus, the N subsystems corresponding tox i t are uncontrolled and we need to identifyũ t to optimally control the dynamics of mean-fieldx t with per-step cost given by (29) . Hence, the optimal solution is given bỹ
whereL t is computed as explained in Corollary 3. To complete the proof, note that if agent i ∈ N k of sub-population k ∈ K chooses action u
D. Proof of Theorem 3
As in the proof of Theorem 1 described in Section IV, definȇ
, and u t = vec((ȗ i t ) i∈N ,ū t ). We identify a cost functionc t (x t ,ů t ) as in Corollary 4.
Lemma 2 For time t, t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, there exists functionc t , such that for t ∈ {1, . . . , T −1}, c t (x t , u t ,x t ,ū t ) =c t (x t ,ů t ) and for t = T , c T (x T ) =c T (x T ). In particular, for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1},
To describec t (·), define y t :=
Note that the per-step cost is decomposed into terms that depend only on (x t ,ū t ) and terms that depend only on (x i t ,ȗ i t ) (and terms that do not depend on the control strategy). The rest of the proof follows along the same lines of the proof of Theorem 1. In particular, we consider a deterministic dynamical system and split it into K +1 classes. The agents in class k, k ∈ K, are solving a tracking problem whose solution is given byȗ
The mean-field component is also solving a tracking problem whose solution is given bȳ
The result of the Theorem follows from combining the above equations. Therefore, from standard results in LQR tracking problem, the optimal control law of agent i ∈ N k of subpopulation k ∈ K is given by
E. Proof of Theorem 4
The proof follows the same lines as the proof of Theorem 1 with the following differences. The mean-field is defined asx (25) and (26), respectively, whereĀ t andB t are defined as in Theorem 4.
The equivalent of Lemma 1 is the following:
Consequently, the equivalent of Corollary 4 is the following
Corollary 5 For time t, t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, there exists function c t , such that for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, c t (x t , u t ,x λ t ,ū λ t ) = c t (x t ,ů t ) and for t = T , c T (x T ,x λ T ) =c T (x T ). In particular, for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1},
whereQ t andR t are defined as in Theorem 4.
The rest of the proof is the same as in Section IV-B. We can show that the optimal control strategy of auxiliary model is given bȳ
t=1 are given as in Theorem 4. To complete the proof of Theorem 4, note that
Thus, the control laws specified in Theorem 4 are the optimal centralized control laws, and, a fortiori, the optimal decentralized control laws.
V. PROOF OF RESULTS FOR PMFS-IS
We simplifyĴ − J * using the decomposition of per-step cost presented in Corollary 4. In particular, Lemma 4 For any k ∈ K and i ∈ N k , defines
Proof: We prove the first part by induction. Note that x . Thus, the result is true by induction. Equation (30) immediately follows from the first part and Corollary 4.
Recall thatc t (x t ,ū t ) =x t (Q t + P
Lemma 7 z t is measurable with respect to F t , therefore,
Proposition 2 The relative loss is given
Proof: Recall thatc t (x t ,ū t ) =x t (Q t +P x t )x t +ū t (R t + P u t )ū t . The proof follows immediately from (30) and the following observation:
, and
Therefore, the proof of Proposition 2 is complete.
Proof of Lemma 8: 1) Substitutings t = ξ t + z t andx t = ζ t + z t , we get
where the last two terms in (a) are zero by Lemmas 6 and 7. 2) Substitutingv t =L t ξ t +L t z t andū t =L txt =L t (ζ t + z t ), we get
where the last two terms in (b) are zero by Lemmas 6 and 7.
Proof of Theorem 2
To prove part 1, note thatĴ − J * is the expected total quadratic cost (given by Proposition 2) of a linear (uncontrolled) system ( given by Lemma 5) . Thus,Ĵ − J * is given by (19) whereM 1:T is the solution of the Lyapunov equation (20) . Note that the variance of the initial state and noises in Lemma 5 are given as follows:
To prove part 2 of Theorem 2, first observe that due to (A3), matricesÃ t andQ t do not depend on (|N 1 |, . . . , |N K |); therefore, neither doesM 1:T . Thus the only dependence on the size of the sub-population is due toX 1 andW t . Under (A1b) and (A3), for any sub-population k ∈ K,
) and var(w t ) = diag(var(w 1 t ), . . . , var(w K t )). Thus,
where each of above absolute values is O(
VI. INFINITE HORIZON
The results presented in Sections II and III generalize to infinite horizon setup in a natural manner. Assume that the model is time-invariant, i.e., the matrices {A In addition, the optimal performance is given by
k ,Σ,Ξ k , andΞ are defined as in Theorem 1.
Proof: The proof follows along the same lines of the proof of Theorem 1. We construct an auxiliary system as in Section IV, which consists of |N | + 1 components with decoupled cost and dynamics coupled only through the noise. Since the costs are infinite-horizon discounted and infinitehorizon long run average, the optimal solution is given by appropriate algebraic Riccati equations. 6 
B. Approximate solution for PMFS-IS
In this section, we propose an approximately optimal strategy for Problems 3 and 4 under PMFS-IS. LetL = diag(L 1 , . . . ,L K ) denote a diagonal matrix with diagonal terms ofL k defined as in Theorem 6. We impose the following assumption.
Assumption (A6)
√ β(Ā +BL) is Hurwitz matrix.
LetĴ β denote the performance of strategy (32) wherex t is replaced by z t in (17) and J * β denote the optimal performance under MFS-IS. Then, the difference in performanceĴ β − J * β is bounded. In particular, we have the following Theorem 7 Assume (A1a), (A2), (A5), (A6) and (PMFS-IS). Then, for β ∈ (0, 1], we have 1) The performance loss is given bŷ
whereX 1 andW are time-homogeneous and defined as in Theorem 2 andM is the solution of following algebraic Lyapunov equation:
whereÃ andQ are defined as in
Proof: The proof follows along the same lines of the proof of Theorem 2. In particular, under (A5) and (A6), √ βÃ of Proposition 2 is Hurwtiz; hence, the performance loss may be computed by the associated algebraic Lyapunov equation given by (34) . Note that even thoughQ is not positive semi-definite, the algebraic Lyapunov equation has a solution [39] . The proof of part 2 of Theorem 7 follows from (33) and observation 6 Note that an infinite-horizon discounted problem with 4-tuple (A, B, Q, R) and discount factor β is equivalent to an undiscounted problem with 4-tuple ( √ βA, √ βB, Q, R).
that (i)M given by (34) does not depend on n due to (A3); (ii) (X 1 ,W ) are O(1/n) due to (A1b).
Remark 10 Assumption (A6) is always satisfied if D k t = 0 and E k t = 0 for all k ∈ K. In this case,
where each of the diagonal terms are Hurwitz by definition ofL k given in Theorem 6.
VII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
To illustrate our results, we consider an example that is motivated by demand response in power systems. In demand response, the volatility in renewable generation is compensated by making small changes in the demand of a large number of loads. We model the load dynamics according to a model proposed in [40] , but consider a different per-step cost.
Consider a homogeneous population N of space heaters. For space heater i, i ∈ N , the state x i t denotes the room temperature at time t. Consider a nominal temperature x nom and let u nom be the control input needed to maintain the room temperature at x nom . Following [40] , we linearize dynamics around x nom , i.e.,
where u i t is control input in addition to u nom and w i t is a random disturbance. We assume u nom is large enough such that (u i t + u nom ) is positive. Let x i des denote the desired temperature of user i. It is assumed that the mean desired temperaturex des is known to everyone (e.g., independent system operator (ISO) could compute it and broadcast the mean value to everyone or it could be computed in a distributed manner using a consensus algorithm). For the purpose of demand response, time is Demand response with a population of 100 space heaters. In the initial phase, 1 ≤ t ≤ 50, the system is uncontrolled. In the first epoch 50 < t ≤ 150, the system tracks a mean reference temperature ofx ref The rationale for the per-step cost is that we penalize deviations from the desired temperature (which corresponds to the user's comfort level), the control effort, and deviation of the mean temperature from the reference prescribed by the ISO. The weights ( T −t T ) and t T are so that we linearly move from preferring individual preferences to preferring global preferences.
The above problem is an optimal tracking problem and the optimal strategy is given by Theorem 3. As an example, we consider the following values of the parameters: n = 100, a = 0.8, b = 1, q = 1, p = 10, r = 50, T = 100, x nom = 20, w 
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented team optimal control of a decentralized system with partially exchangeable agents. Partial exchangeability implies that such a system is equivalent to one where the dynamics and the cost are coupled only through the meanfield. Our two main results are as follows. First, when the mean field is observed by all agents (the MFS information structure), the linear control laws are optimal and the corresponding gains are computed by solving K + 1 Riccati equations, where K is the number of sub-populations. The dimensions of these Riccati equations are independent of the size of subpopulations; consequently, the solution complexity depends only on the number K of sub-populations (rather than the size of the entire population). Second, when the mean-field of a (possibly empty) subset of sub-populations is observed by all agents (the PMFS information structure), a linear control law based on certainty equivalence is approximately optimal.
An important practical implication of these results is that they do not suffer from the curse of dimensionality. In fact, under assumption (A3), the solution does not even depend on the number of agents and the optimal gains can be computed without being aware of the size of each sub-population. Consequently, the solution methodology generalizes to the setup where the agents in a sub-population arrive and depart according to an exogenous process (e.g. number of electric vehicles plugged in for charging in smart grids).
The raison d'etre for investigating decentralized systems is that it is possible-either physically or economically-to send all the state observation to a centralized controller. We show that when agents are partially exchangeable, we may circumvent the conceptual difficulties of decentralized control and achieve the centralized performance by sharing only the mean-field (which can be shared using distributed algorithms such as consensus). Thus, instead of requiring that agents have the capability or the energy to communicate to a centralized controller, agents only require the capacity or the energy to communicate to their neighbors. Moreover, in view of the results of PMFS-IS, one may even decide not to share the mean-field of large sub-populations because there is only a small loss in performance in using the estimated value of the mean-field instead.
Throughout this paper, we assumed that when the meanfield is observed, it is observed without noise. In practice (especially if the mean-field is computed using a consensus algorithm), the mean-field will be observed with noise (and the noise will be different across agents). Our results show that if all sub-populations are large, such an observation noise will not matter. (In fact, the agents may completely ignore the mean-field observations and use the estimated values instead). However, if some of the sub-populations are small, the solution approach is not obvious. In particular, in the special case when all sub-populations have one agent, the problem reduces to the general decentralized control problem with non-classical information structure. Identifying a solution methodology for this general case remains a challenging research direction. 
